Abstract: This paper describes the method of statistically designed experiments (SDEs) which is used as a structured method to investigate the best setting for a number of decision variables in a system design problem. Traditionally, in the design of safety-critical systems, a trial and error type approach is undertaken to achieve a nal system that meets the design objectives. This approach can be time consuming, and often only an adequate design is found rather than the optimal design for the available resources. Optimal use of resources should be imperative when possible lives are at risk. To demonstrate the practicality of this new structured approach for optimizing a safety system design, a high-integrity safety system has been used. Each design is analysed using the binary decision diagram analysis technique to establish the system unavailability, which is penalized if the system constraints are exceeded. System constraints indicate the limitations on the resources that can be utilized. The SDE approach highlights good and bad settings for possible design variables. This knowledge can then be used by more sophisticated search techniques. The latter part of this paper analyses the results from the best design generated using the SDE, for further optimization using localized optimization approaches.
INTRODUCTION
Safety systems are designed to operate when certain conditions occur and act to prevent their development into a hazardous situation. To minimize the risk the potential situation poses to members of the work force or public, it is essential that they have the maximum possible likelihood of working on demand for the resources available.
Techniques such as fault tree analysis [1] , networks [2] , Markov analysis [3] and simulation [4] are now commonly used for system availability assessment. However, they are usually used in the traditional engineering design process. This involves setting values of a potentially large number of decision variables, and then adjusting them either one at a time or by trial and error until an acceptable design performance is achieved. One criterion used to determine the adequacy of the design is a comparison with a predetermined target gure for its availability. This gives rise to an inef cient, unstructured design process, which will result in a design that is unlikely to make best use of available resources.
It is unlikely that the full implications of setting the design variables could be understood for complex systems and therefore unlikely that the design parameters can be manually selected to yield optimal system safety performance. An approach using fault tree analysis to predict the system availability of each system design has been used in conjunction with the grid-sampling method to nd the optimal design [5] . Improvements in this approach have been made using binary decision diagrams [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] , and also by incorporation of a genetic algorithm [11, 12] to perform the optimization. This optimization technique allows a number of design alternatives to be investigated simultaneously. In using these search-based optimization techniques, the outcome is heavily reliant on the start point of the search.
An alternative to the traditional ad hoc approach to engineering design is statistically designed experiments (SDEs), which are a structured method to investigate the best settings for a potentially large number of decision variables [13, 14] . Statistical design of experiments means making many purposeful design changes at once and conducting several tests and evaluations before decisions are taken as to what the next steps in the development process should be. In this paper, the experimental design concepts are being used to try to gain a good starting point for the optimization. The better the starting point, the more ef cient the optimization will be. In this way it is hoped to achieve about 80 per cent of the work required to reach an optimal design using about 20 per cent of the effort. The research shows, by means of application to a safety system, that adopting this approach can lead to generating an optimal design in a much more ef cient manner than when applying traditional design processes. In addition, the technique can be used to search out good starting points, which can be used by more sophisticated optimization techniques to nd the best system con guration.
STATISTICALLY DESIGNED EXPERIMENTS

Components of an SDE
In an SDE the variables to be changed are called factors. Prior to conducting an SDE (otherwise known as a factorial experiment), all factors must be identi ed and the possible values of each factor determined. These possible values are termed levels. The performance of the engineering system is characterized by a measurement of some aspect or function termed the response.
Purposeful design changes are determined using special matrices called orthogonal arrays. Consider, for example, a particular system consisting of three parameters: number of valves (A), valve type (B) and number of pressure transmitters (C). As regards each parameter, two settings are chosen to cover the range of interest. These factor levels de ne the experimental region and are listed in Table 1 .
The goal is to minimize system unavailability, and, as such, the response is the probability of system failure, Q SYS . The matrix experiment to de ne the experimental plan is stated in Table 2 . It consists of four individual experiment designs corresponding to the four rows. The three columns of the matrix represent the three factors whose values are indicated in Table 1 . Thus, the rst design consists of two valves of type 1 and four pressure transmitters. The matrix experiment is the standard orthogonal array L 4 [15] . For any pair of columns, all combinations of factor levels occur, and they occur an equal number of times. This is called the balancing property and it implies orthogonality. This balancing property inherent in orthogonal arrays enables the identi cation of which design changes make the difference to the performance of a design.
A matrix experiment consisting of all possible combinations of the factors is termed 'full factorial'. The run size for a twolevel full factorial design in k factors is 2 k , which quickly becomes prohibitive for a moderate amount of factors. The problem is exacerbated for factors with more than two levels. A subset or fraction of the full factorial design (a fractional factorial) tends to be used unless there are only a few potentially important factors to be studied. In the example above, the orthogonalarray represents a 'one-halffraction'of the 2 3 design.
Steps in a statistically designed experiment
An outline of the statistically designed experimental procedure is as follows:
1. De nition of the aim of the experimental plan and selection of the response variable. 2. Selection of the factors that will be changed and the levels that will be used. 3. Choice of a matrix experiment such that the plan has a systematic and balanced pattern. 4. Analysis of the data from the matrix experiment to determine the effects of the various factors. The effects of the various factors can be determined by computing simple averages. The estimates of the factor effects are then used to determine the optimum factor settings. 5. Summary of the results in a response table and effects plot. The use of engineering knowledge and common sense is essential in interpreting the results. 6. Validation of conclusions from the experiment using follow-up runs and con rmation testing. 
SAFETY SYSTEM DESIGN EXAMPLE
The high-integrity protection system (HIPS) has been used previously to demonstrate design optimization using genetic algorithms [11, 12] . The full design considerations are outlined within these papers, along with the binary decision diagram technique, which is used to assess the availability of each design. The basic features of the system are shown in Fig. 1 . Its function is to prevent a high-pressure surge passing through the system. In this way, protection is provided for processing equipment whose pressure rating would be exceeded. The high pressure originates from a production well of a not normally manned offshore platform, and the pieces of equipment to be protected are vessels located downstream on the processing platform.
The rst level of protection is the emergency shutdown (ESD) subsystem. Pressure in the pipeline is monitored using pressure transmitters (PTs). When the pipeline pressure exceeds the permitted value, then the ESD system acts to close the wing and master valves on the well, together with any ESD valves that have been tted.
To provide an additional level of protection, a second level of redundancy can be incorporated by the inclusion of a HIPS. This works in a similar manner to the ESD system but is completely independent in operation.
Even with a relatively simple system such as this there are a vast number of options for the designer to consider. In this example it is required to determine values for the design variables that represent the following: Limitations have been placed on the design such that:
1. The total system cost must be less than 1000 units. Hardware costs are given in Table 3 . 2. The average time each year that the system resides in the down state owing to preventive maintenance must be less than 130 h. Times taken to test each component at each maintenance test are also shown in Table 3 . 3. The number of times that a spurious system shutdown occurs would be unacceptable if it were more than once per year.
To assess the performance of a potential system design, the system unavailability needs to be considered along with the limitations that are placed on the system. Thus, the performance depends on four parts:
(a) the probability of system failure (unavailability, Q SYS ); (b) a penalty for the design exceeding the total cost constraint, Cpen; (c) a penalty for exceeding the total maintenance downtime constraint, MDTpen; (d) a penalty for exceeding the spurioustrip constraint,STpen.
These are combined to give a sole value to represent system performance for each design, referred to as the penalized system unavailability of the design. Calculating the penalized system unavailability, Q 0 SYS , involves the derivation of the penalty formula for excess cost, maintenance downtime and spurious trip occurrences [11] . If a particular design exceeds any of the stated limits, the respective penalty is added to the system unavailability of the design in question Q
Q SYS is calculated from the binary design diagram representation of the system fault tree using component failure and repair data given in Table 3 .
APPLICATION OF THE STATISTICALLY DESIGNED EXPERIMENT TO OPTIMIZE THE HIPS
Aim and response variable
The means by which the performance of a safety system design is assessed (i.e. the response variable) is chosen to be the penalized system unavailability, Q 0 SYS . The primary goal is to determine the optimal level of each design variable such that Q 0 SYS is minimized. The secondary goal, which is addressed throughout the experimental procedure, is to determine the effect (or lack of effect) that each design variable has on Q SYS , maintenance downtime, cost and the spurious trip frequency. The SDE is essentially a global optimization procedure that initially encompasses a large proportion of the entire search space. Attainment of the global minimum, i.e. the primary goal, with this somewhat crude approach is unexpected. However, it is expected, through attention to the latter goal, to determine promising areas in the search space and hence a starting point, or points, from which to commence a more sophisticated approach.
Choice of factors and levels
All ten parameters associated with the HIPS were included to perform the initial experiment. The intention was to screen out the less important factors before carrying out a more detailed follow-up experiment. Levels of the factors should be chosen to be suf ciently far apart to cover a wide experimental region. This makes it possible to identify good and bad regions of the search space. During subsequent re nement, experiment levels closer to one another can be chosen. Each factor and their alternate levels selected for consideration are listed in Table 4 .
Matrix experiment
An ef cient way to study the effects of several factors simultaneously is to plan a matrix experiment using an orthogonal array. An orthogonal array is constructed from the knowledgeof the number of factors, their levels and the desire to study interactions. In this initial experiment there are ve two-level factors and ve three-level factors. For the purpose of the screening experiment it was decided not to study speci c interactions. Using the standard methods of constructing orthogonal arrays, the standard array L 27 ( 3 13 ) was selected for the matrix experiment. References [16] and [17] provide further detail on array construction and standard arrays. The standard array has 13 columns and 27 rows. Each row has three distinct entries, namely 1, 2 and 3 (i.e. each column is a three-level column). As such, a three-level factor can be assigned directly to any column. Five of the chosen factors have two levels. The dummy level techniquewas used to assign each two-level factor to a three-level factor. The dummy level techniqueworks on the basis that, if a factor A has two levels A 1 and A 2 , it can be assigned to a three-level column by creating a dummy level A 3 , which could be taken to be the same as either A 1 or A 2 . For a more detailed explanation, refer to reference [18] .
The modi ed L 27 (2
) array representing the 27 safety system designs to be investigated is translated using the level de nition in Table 4 to create a clear experimental plan (see Table 5 ). Each design, dictated by the matrix experiment, was analysed using equation (1) . The nal column of Table 5 gives the resulting penalized unavailability of the speci ed system design.
Data analysis
Data analysis is concerned with estimating the effect of each parameter on the penalized system unavailability over the 27 designs investigated. The overall mean value of Q 0 SYS for the experimental region was 0.0342. The effect of a factor is de ned to be the change in the response produced by a change in the level of the factor. This is commonly termed the main effect. For example, the main effect of the valve type parameter at level 1, V 1 , is given by 
where m V 1 denotes the main effect of parameter V at level 1, and Q 0 iSYS denotes the penalized system unavailability for design i.
The main effect of each factor at each of its levels is speci ed in Table 6 . A better feel for the relative effect of the different factors can be obtained using the analysis of variance (ANOVA) technique. The sum of squares due to factor V, SS V , is equal to the total squared deviation of each level of V from the overall mean, m. Eighteen designs are investigated with V at level 1, and nine designs with V at level 2. Thus
The sum of squares due to each factor can be seen in Table 6 . This table indicates that the parameter P governing the pressure transmitter type contributes a major proportion of the total variation in Q 0 SYS . In fact, it is responsible for 83.1 per cent of the variation.
Selecting optimum factor levels
The primary goal in conducting the matrix experiment is to determine the best or optimum level for each factor. As regards the HIPS, the optimum level for each factor is the level that gives the lowest value of Q 0 SYS in the experimental region. The estimated main effects can be used for this purpose. Therefore, the settings V 1 , P 1 , E 1 , K1 2 , N1 2 , H 1 , K2 2 , N2 1 , y1 1 , y2 1 would give the lowest penalized system unavailability. Note that the subscript denotes the level of that parameter.
The predicted best settings need not correspond to one of the rows in the matrix experiment (Table 5) , as is the case here. Prior to implementing any design suggested by the technique, it must be fully evaluated. The con rmed SYS realized for the predicted best settings is not as good as the best among the rows of the matrix experiment. The cause of this could be the coarse nature of the approach, or it may indicate the presence of signi cant interactions among the variables. Realization that the design proposed does not meet the desired optimal target means that practical implementation is not carried out and additional analysis and investigation are needed to nd better settings.
Additional analysis
The main effects of the factors are their independent effects. If the effect of a factor depends on the level of another, then the two factors are said to have an interaction. Within engineering applications this interaction is commonplace. For example, if there is redundancy within the system in the form of a two out of three voting set-up, changing the level of redundancy has a direct effect on the number of components required to trip the system. For the HIPS, the large effect of parameter P dominates the effect of the other parameters. The variables in the trip mechanism, such as the number of pressure transmitters, the number required to trip and the type of pressure transmitter, are likely to have related effects. The main effects (shown diagrammatically in Fig. 2 ) clearly indicate that pressure transmitter type 1 is the optimum level for this factor.
As such, the main effects of K1, N1, K2 and N2 are revised using only a subset of the designs in the L 27 array. That is, those designs with P set at level 1. The main effects (penalized system unavailability) for each of these variables for P at level 1 are speci ed in Table 7 .
It can be seen that the optimal settings for K1, N1, K2 and N2 at P1 are levels 1, 1, 2 and 2 respectively. This gives a design speci ed by a one from two trip con guration for subsystem 1 and a two from three trip con guration for subsystem 2. A con rmation run of the revised prediction specifying the best design gives a MDT of 112.7 h, a cost of 652 units, a spurious trip frequency of 0.54/year and a probability of system unavailability of 0.0014 (no penalties incurred). It is an improvement over the initial prediction and equals the best in the original experiments table, i.e. as shown by design 1 of Table 8 .
Considerations for follow-up experiment
To carry out a follow-up experiment, it must be determined which factors besides P have a strong effect on the response. It was noted that the main effects of each parameter were biased by signi cantly large values of Q 0 SYS , which resulted from the exertion of penalties due to constraint violations. To investigate this further, the effect of each parameter on system cost, MDT and spurious trip frequency, F 0 SYS , was established.
The main effect of each factor level with respect to system cost is shown in Table 9 , as well as the sum of squares due to each factor and the percentage of variation for which the factor is responsible. These gures were also calculated for MDT (Table 10 ) and spurious trip frequency (Table 11) . Factor E was found to explain a major proportion of the total variation in cost, 87 per cent, with H being the next largest contributor at 6 per cent. Variables E, y1 and H were calculated to account for a large proportion of the total variation in MDT. To a lesser extent, V was also found to contribute to the variation in MDT.
Fig. 2 Plot of the main effect of each factor
The parameters that contribute to the variation in spurious trip frequency were found to be those associated with the pressure transmitters. However, the parameter governing the pressure transmitter type accounted for over 50 per cent of the variation alone. A design that constitutes pressure transmitters of type 2 generally has a high spurious trip frequency and hence receives a substantial penalty. This explains the dominance of parameter P regarding variation in the penalized system unavailability. Signi cant variation in the trip frequency still exists in many of the parameters when only those designs in the matrix with pressure transmitter type 1 are considered. However, this variation occurs below the spurious trip limit (i.e. 1.0). Owing to their in uence on the constraints of the safety system design, it was decided to carry out a follow-up experiment addressing parameters E, H, V, y2 and y1 speci cally.
FOLLOW-UP EXPERIMENT
A follow-up experiment involving fewer factors was used to explore the response-factor relationship in more detail. The purpose of this step is to verify that the optimum conditions suggested by the initial matrix experiment are indeed accurate and determine whether improvements can be made. It is possible that the veri cation experiment may identify strong interactions between parameters and highlight potentially misleading information. The factors selected for the follow-up experiment and their alternative levels are given in Table 12 .
Observations from the screening experiment implied that the inclusion of three ESD valves is not bene cial, and the variable is now only set at two levels. The remaining variables were set to pressure transmitter type 1 with a trip con guration of one from two and two from three pressure transmitters for the ESD subsystem and HIPS subsystem respectively. These parameter values are the best settings predicted in the screening experiment.
In this study it was decided not only to estimate the main effects of the ve factors listed in Table 12 , but also to estimate four potential interactions identi ed from engineering experience. The four interactions considered to be most important were:
(a) valve type and ESD valve number, V 6 E; (b) valve type and HIPS valve number, V 6 H; (c) ESD valve number and HIPS valve number, E 6 H; (d) test interval 1 and test interval 2, y1 6 y2.
The matrix experiment to take account of the ve factors and the four interactions is given in Table 13 (see reference [16] for details of experimental design construction). The values of the levels of each factor are given in the table as opposed to using their level code. This gives a clearer indication of the design characteristics being investigated in each run.
The average values for system unavailability, cost, MDT, spurious trip frequency, system unavailability and penalized system unavailability for all designs are 1.26 6 10
¡3
, 855.1 units, 132 h, 0.63/year and 2.6 6 10 ¡3 respectively. The best design is represented in column 24 of Table 13 and has a system unavailability of 7.36 6 10 ¡4 (costˆ822 units, MDTˆ130 h, spurious trip frequencyˆ0.72/year).
Data analysis
As with the rst experiment, the main effect of each factor with respect to the penalized system unavailability was calculated and is shown in Table 14 and the effects plot in (Fig. 3) . It was estimated from the main effects that the settings V 2 , E 1 , H 1 , y1 4 and y2 4 would give the lowest penalized system unavailability, where the subscript number identi es the factor level. A con rmation run gives MDT7 8 h, costˆ602 units, spurious trip frequencyˆ0.625 per year and probability of system unavailabilityˆ0.0031 (no penalties incurred). This design is poor compared with the best design from the follow-up experiment, the unavailability of which is considerably less at 7.36 6 10
¡4
. Also, the cost of this design is only 622 units, indicating the possibility of utilizing further resources. Therefore, consideration is given to the key interactions. Table 15 and Fig. 4 represent the data for the interactions V 6 E and V 6 H. Speci cally, the main effect of factor E is Table 12 Factor levels in the follow-up experiment Levels F a c t o r 1 2 3 4 calculated at the rst level of factor V, then at the second level of factor V; V 6 H is considered in a similar manner. The effects for E 6 H and y1 6 y2 are also given in Tables 16 and 17 and visually in Fig. 5 .
If there is no interaction between two factors, an effects plot of one factor against both levels of the other will portray two parallel lines. No interaction implies that a change in level of one factor will produce the same change in the response regardless of the level of the other factor. In this case, the optimum levels identi ed by the main effects are valid. If the lines in the effects plot are not parallel but have the same direction of movement, then an interaction is present. However, the optimum levels identi ed in the main effects are likely still be to valid. This is termed a synergistic interaction. However, an inconsistent direction of movement on the effects plot implies a strong interaction between the factors. In such cases the optimum level identi ed by the main effects may be misleading. This is termed an antisynergistic interaction.
It is apparent from the main effect and interaction plots that:
1. There is a synergistic interaction between the parameters V and E and V and H. The interaction is stronger in the former. The best settings for the parameters levels V, E and H are 2, 1 and 1 respectively (i.e. valve type 2 with no ESD valves and one HIPS valve). 2. There is an antisynergistic interaction between parameters E and H. This makes sense as both incur signi cant cost to the design. The results from the interaction investigation contradict the main effects data which indicated that, when the number of ESD valves is 0 (its optimal setting), the best level for factor H is 2 (i.e. two HIPS valves tted). 3. Strong interaction exists between the maintenance test interval parameters, and, as such, the main effects associated with y1 and y2 may be misleading. The implication from Fig. 5 is that the higher maintenance test interval values are generally bene cial. This is due to the fact that such values do not incur a penalty as a 
Optimum factor settings
The best settings of the factors suggested by the above results are identical to those of the best design in the design matrix of the follow-up experiment (note that the best settings of factors P, K1, N1, K2 and N2 are carried over from the initial experiment). As such, a veri cation experiment is not required to establish the response associated with the predicted best design. The performance characteristics of the resulting best design are given in Table 18 . The safety system is over 99.9 per cent available and achieves full use of the MDT resource.
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Data analysis of the initial experiment clearly indicated that the optimal safety system design should constitute pressure transmitters of type 1. It was further implied that the optimal trip con guration using this pressure transmitter is one from two for subsystem 1 and two from three for subsystem 2. It was noted that the penalized designs were causing a bias in the main effects, and, as such, further analysis was carried out to determine which parameters had the greatest effect on constraint violation. The implication was that parameters E, H, V and y1 are the most in uential. Logic dictates that parameter y2 is also in uential as regards system MDT. In light of this evidence, a more detailed follow-up experiment was implemented using the factors stated above. A study of potential key interactions was also incorporated. It was found that parameters V and E and V and H portrayed a synergistic interaction, whereas E and H and both test parameters portrayed an antisynergistic interaction. The interaction plots indicated that the optimal safety system design incorporated no ESD valves and two HIPS valves, with both test intervals set at 30 week intervals. The optimum level predicted for each factor corresponded to the best design in the follow-up matrix experiment. The system unavailability of the design is 7.36 6 10 ¡4 with no constraint violations.
APPLICATION OF LOCAL OPTIMIZATION TECHNIQUES
It is expected that K1 and N1, in addition to K2 and N2, will portray signi cant interaction. A matrix experiment could be developed in a similar vein to that described in section 5 to investigate these interactions further. In the main, however, the experimental approach is a global technique that considers the entire search space to glean greater knowledge in order to determine potentially good (and bad) areas of the space. This knowledge can then be used to assist further, more sophisticated techniques. The grid-sampling technique [19] and logical search approach [19] are, in contrast, localized, hill-climbing methods that rely on a good start point to achieve an optimal solution. As opposed to further re nement of the resulting design speci ed in Table 18 , using SDEs, the design vector is used as an initial design point in the aforementioned localized approaches.
Using the grid-sampling technique, it was found that a safety system design more optimal than the initial design vector could not be achieved. An explanation for this could be that the initial design vector is exceedingly t. As such, the errors introduced via the use of approximate objective functions to analyze the search space about the initial design point are large in comparison with the difference between the initial design vector and the global minimum.
The nal design resulting from application of the logical search approach has a one from two as opposed to a two from three pressure transmitter trip con guration constituting subsystem 2, in addition to modi cation of the maintenance test interval parameters. An improvement of 1. 3£   Fig. 5 Effects plot for the E 6 H and y1 6 y2 interactions 
¡4
Penalized system unavailability 7.36 6 10 ¡4 ¡3 in system unavailability is achieved, resulting in a safety system design that is over 99.92 per cent available. The logical search approach implements an accurate investigation of the region directly surrounding the value of each variable in the initial design vector while considering the degree of interaction between the design variables. The initial point proves in this case to be suf ciently t for the believed global optimum to be found.
CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
The use of orthogonal arrays to develop an experimental design is an ef cient way to study the effects of several control factors simultaneously. It is bene cial to adopt an iterative approach to acquire knowledge as the experimental plan progresses, and thus adapt the process accordingly. Designs suggested by the technique are tested for con rmation of their predictive potential, preventing the selection of a poor design. In the worst-case scenario (i.e. if any factors exhibit strong interactions), good and bad regions of the search space are identi ed and an indication of the relative importance of each factor is acquired. As such, further exploration can proceed using an appropriate local search technique based on the information established. In the bestcase scenario, the optimum level for some, if not all, of the factors is determined. Importantly, the experimental effort required is much smaller when compared with other methods of exploration such as trial and error, one factor at a time and full factorial experiments. It is recognized that investigating many design parameters at two relatively extreme values does not carry the sophistication of other more detailed and complex methods. However, the more detailed design methods work more ef ciently if they are working to update a reasonable design. It is suggested that this SDE approach be used not to produce a nal design itself but to locate a good starting point for a more complex design approach that is capable of modelling each design variable at more levels.
